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Abstract
We give an elementary proof of a conjecture by Hegselmann and Krause
in opinion dynamics, concerning a symmetric bounded confidence in-
terval model: If there is a truth and all individuals take each other
seriously by a positive amount bounded away from zero, then all truth
seekers will converge to the truth. Here truth seekers are the indi-
viduals which are attracted by the truth by a positive amount. In
the absence of truth seekers it was already shown by Hegselmann and
Krause that the opinions of the individuals converge.
1 Introduction
We answer in the affirmative a conjecture posed by Hegselmann and Krause
about the long-term behavior of opinions in a finite group of individuals,
some of them attracted to the truth, the so-called truth seekers. Our contri-
bution: Under mild assumptions, the opinions of all truth seekers converge
to the truth, despite being distracted by individuals not attracted to the
truth, the ignorants.
The underlying model for opinion dynamics is the bounded-confidence
model : Opinions, which themselves are represented by real numbers in the
unit interval, are influenced by the opinions of others by means of averag-
ing, but only if not too far away. This bounded-confidence model (formal
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definitions below) was first suggested by Krause in 1997. It received a con-
siderable amount of attention in the artificial societies and social simulation
community [5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6].
The concept of truth seekers was invented in 2006 by Hegselmann and
Krause [3], along with a philosophical discussion about the scientific con-
text with respect to the notion of truth. We blind out the philosophical
discussions here and focus on the resulting dynamical system, governed by
difference equations that we find interesting in their own right.
The opinions of truth seekers are not only attracted by opinions of oth-
ers; they are additionally attracted by a constant number, the truth. The
resulting opinion is weighted average of the result of the original bounded-
confidence dynamics and the truth. Individuals not attracted by the truth
in this sense are ignorants. In their paper, Hegselmann and Krause show
that if all individuals are truth seekers – no matter how small the weight –,
then (the opinions of) all the individuals converge to consensus on the truth
value.
The question we answer in this paper arises when some of the individ-
uals are ignorants, i.e., the weight of the influence of the truth is zero for
them. Numerous simulation experiments led Hegselmann and Krause to the
conjecture, that still the opinions of all the truth seekers finally end up at
the truth. However, a proof of this fact could not be found so far. Evidence
by simulation only, however, bears the risk of numerical artefacts – very
much so in the non-continuous bounded-confidence model. Therefore, it is
desirable to provide mathematically rigid proofs of structural properties of
bounded-confidence dynamics.
Allthough the conjecture may seem self-understood at first glance be-
cause of the contraction property of the system dynamics for truth seekers, a
second look on the situation reveals that the conjecture and its confirmation
in this paper are far from trivial: several innocent-looking generalizations
of the conjecture are actually false, as we will show below in the technical
parts of the paper. Relying on intuition only is dangerous.
Even in the affirmative cases, convergence turns out to be quite slow in
general and far from monotone. The main difficulty is the following: the
convergence of truth seekers heavily depends on their long-term influence
on ignorants. Depending on the configuration of ignorants and the param-
eters of the system, there are arbitrarily many iterations in which the truth
seekers deviate from the truth. The crucial observation is that, during these
iterations, the configuration of ignorants is somehow “improved” because
the truth seekers attract them.
After all, the proof is elementary but extremely technical. We introduce
some structures like the confidence graph, that might prove useful also in
other contexts. Other structures we need are rather special, probably with
limited use beyond this paper. It would, therefore, be desirable to find a
more elegant proof, revealing the reason why the conjecture is true. For
example: find a suitable Lyapunov function. The examples we give as we go
along in the proof, however, indicate that a certain amount of complexity
has to be captured by the arguments because the line between true and false
conjectures is extremely thin.
2 Formal problem statement
Suppose there is a set [n] := {1, . . . , n} of individuals with opinions xi(t) ∈
[0, 1] at time t for all i ∈ [n], t ∈ N. The abstract truth is modeled as
a constant over time, denoted by h ∈ [0, 1]. The opinion of an individual
i ∈ [n] is influenced in a time step t only by those individuals which have
a similar opinion, more precisely which have an opinion in the confidence
interval of xi(t).
Definition 1 For x ∈ [0, 1] and a parameter ε ≥ 0 we define the confidence
set of value x at time t as
Iεx(t) := {j ∈ [n] | |x− xj(t)| ≤ ε}.
As a shorthand we define Iεi (t) := I
ε
xi(t)
(t) for any i ∈ [n].
The update of the opinions is modeled as a weighted arithmetic mean of
opinions in the confidence set and a possible attraction towards the truth.
Definition 2 A weighted arithmetic mean symmetric bounded confidence
opinion system (WASBOCOS) is a tupel
(n, h, ε, α, β;αi(t), βij(t), xi(0)),
where
• n ∈ N ist the number of individuals,
• h ∈ [0, 1] ist the truth,
• ε ∈ [0, 1] is the bounded confidence radius,
• α ∈ (0, 1] is a lower bound for the weight of the truth for truth seekers,
• β ∈ (0, 12 ] is a lower bound for the weight of opinions in the bounded
confidence interval,
• αi(t) ∈ [α, 1] or αi(t) = 0 for all t ∈ N is the actual weight of the truth
for truth seeker i at time step t,
• βij(t) ∈ [β, 1− β] with
∑n
i=j βij = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and for all t ∈ N is
the weight of opinion j in the view of agent i,
h• xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] is the starting opinion of Individual i.
The bounded confidence dynamics on such a system is defined by simulta-
neous updates of the opinions in the following form:
xi(t+ 1) := αi(t) · h+
(
1− αi(t)
) ∑
j∈Iεi (t)
βij(t)xj(t)∑
j∈Iεi (t)
βij(t)
. (1)
Individuals are members of the index set [n]. Truth seekers are members of
the set K := {k ∈ [n] | αk(t) ≥ α ∀t ∈ N}. All other individuals, i.e., those
with αi(t) = 0 for all t, are called ignorants; their set is denoted by K.
See Figure 2 for a sketch of a typical set of trajectories. Remark: The
term symmetric in the notion of a (WASBOCOS) refers to the confidence
radius, not to the weights that individuals assign to other individuals’ opin-
ions. The main result we wish to prove is the following:
Theorem 1 (Generalized Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture) All truth seekers
in an (WASBOCOS) Ω converge to the truth h. Formally, for each γ > 0
and each Ω there exists a T (γ,Ω) so that we have |xk(t) − h| < γ for all
k ∈ K and all t ≥ T (γ,Ω).
Note that we use γ > 0 in the statement of convergence instead of ε > 0
because ε is traditionally used for the bounded confidence radius.
It is important that convergence is not just implied by the contraction
property of the dynamics with ignorants ignored. Ignorants and where their
opinions are make a huge difference (see Figure 1 for an example).
It would be nice if one could derive a bound on the speed of convergence,
i.e., a bound on T (γ,Ω), in terms of the structural parameters ε, α, β, and
n. Unfortunately, this is not possible. The speed of convergence is not
determined by the structural parameters alone. This can be seen in the
following simple example.
Figure 1: The only truth seeker is located at the bottom on the truth; it gets
attracted away from the truth for quite some time; eventually, the ignorants
either are “converted” or left behind. Thus, we cannot expect monotone
convergence of the truth seeker farthest from the truth, i.p, reaching the
truth once does not imply convergence to the truth.
Example 1 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with truth h = ε, ε > 0, α1(t) = α,
α2(t) = 0, βij(t) =
1
2 , β =
1
2 , x1(0) = 2ε, x2(0) = ε˜, where ε > ε˜ > 0. Let
T ∈ N be the smallest integer so that (1− α)T ε ≤ ε˜. Then by induction we
have x1(t) = ε + (1 − α)tε and x2(t) = x2(0) = ε˜ for all t ≤ T . So truth
seeker 1 seems to monotonically converge to the truth, but at time T + 1 we
have x1(T + 1) = αε+
1−α
2
(
ε+ (1− α)T ε+ ε˜) ≤ 1+α2 · ε+ ε˜.
See Figure 2 for a sketch of the situation. Since we may choose ε˜ arbitrarily
small, we find the following: in general, we can not expect that for every
γ > 0 there is a T (γ, ε, α, β, n) such that for all t ≥ T (γ, ε, α, β, n) we have
|xk(t) − h| < γ for each truth seeker k ∈ K. But we may have interrupted
convergence: In a first phase, the truth seekers come arbitrarily close to
the truth in time only dependent on the structural parameters; then, they
may temporarily get distracted at some point; finally, they converge to the
truth in time depending only on the structural parameters and the time of
distraction. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 3 Given ε, α, β, n, we say that truth seekers k ∈ K are (1-
fold) interrupted convergent to the truth, if for each γ > 0 there exist two
functions T s1 (γ, ε, α, β, n) and T
s
2 (γ, ε, α, β, n, T
e
1 ), so that for each (WAS-
BOCOS) Ω, with structural parameters ε, α, β and n, there exists an T e1 ∈ N
satisfying
∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ [T s1 (γ, ε, α, β, n), T e1 ] : |xk(t)− h| < γ,
∀k ∈ K, ∀t ≥ T s2 (γ, ε, α, β, n, T e1 ) : |xk(t)− h| < γ.
Theorem 1 is now a corollary of the following substantially strengthened
Theorem:
ε2ε
ε˜
Figure 2: A sketch of interrupted convergence: a lonely truth seeker starting
at 2ε seems to monotonically converge to the truth right away, but suddenly
its confidence interval picks up the ignorant on the other side of the truth,
and the truth seeker gets distracted. However, finally the ignorant gets
distracted himself, and convergence is eventually established.
Theorem 2 All truth seekers in an (WASBOCOS) Ω are (1-fold) inter-
rupted convergent to the truth.
Originally Hegselmann and Krause considered the (WASBOCOS) model
for αi(t) ∈ {0, α} and βij(t) = 1n . In the case of complete absence of truth
seekers they have already proved, that the opinion of each individual con-
verges, as can be expected, not necessarily to the truth. In fact in general the
individuals form several clusters, where two individuals of different clusters
converge to different opinions.
We give an example without truth seekers where the individuals will
converge to five different clusters.
Example 2 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with αi(t) = 0 (no truth seekers),
β = βij(t) =
1
n , n = 12; the values of α and h do not matter. The starting
positions are given by
x1(0) = x2(0) = 0, x3(0) = ε, x4(0) = 2ε, x5(0) = 3ε, x6(0) = x7(0) = 4ε,
x8(0) = 5ε, x9(0) = 6ε, x10(0) = 7ε, andx11(0) = x12(0) = 8ε,
see Figure 3.
In Table 1 we give the complete dynamics of the opinions of all 12 in-
dividuals over time until the opinion of every individual has converged. For
brevity we write xi instead of xi(t). After three time steps, see Figure 4 for
the dynamics, we have reached a stable state, see Figure 5 for the resulting
positions of the individuals.
hh h h h hh h h h hh
0ε 1ε 2ε 3ε 4ε 5ε 6ε 7ε 8ε
Figure 3: Starting positions of the individuals in Example 2.
t x1 = x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 = x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 = x12
0 0ε 1ε 2ε 3ε 4ε 5ε 6ε 7ε 8ε
1 13ε
3
4ε 2ε
13
4 ε 4ε
19
4 ε 6ε
29
4 ε
23
3 ε
2 1736ε
17
36ε 2ε
15
4 ε 4ε
17
4 ε 6ε
271
36 ε
271
36 ε
3 1736ε
17
36ε 2ε 4ε 4ε 4ε 6ε
271
36 ε
271
36 ε
Table 1: The dynamics of Example 2 in numbers.
Figure 4: The dynamics in Example 2.
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Figure 5: Final positions of the individuals in Example 2.
We remark that for symmetric weights βij(t) = βji(t) one can easily show
that in the absence of truth seekers the dynamics becomes stable after a finite
number of time steps. In the case of asymmetric weights βij(t) 6= βji(t) we
only have convergence, but need not reach a stable state after an arbitrary,
problem dependent, but finite number of time steps, as illustrated in the
following example.
Example 3 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with αi(t) = 0 (no truth seekers),
n = 2, x1(0) = 0, x2(0) = ε, β11(t) =
2
3 , β12(t) =
1
3 = β, β21(t) =
1
2 ,
β22(t) =
1
2 ; the values of α and h do not matter.
One can easily verify, e.g., by induction, that we have
x1(t) =
(
2
5
− 2
5 · 6t
)
· ε and x2(t) =
(
2
5
+
3
5 · 6t
)
· ε
for all t ∈ N. So we have |x1(t)− x2(t)| = 16t · ε > 0 but clearly the opinions
of the two individuals converge to 25 .
All stated insights with the absence of truth seekers were known so far. It
becomes a bit more interesting if we allow truth seekers, i.e., if we consider
a general (WASBOCOS).
Example 4 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with α1(t) = α, αi(t) = 0 for i 6= 1,
βij(t) =
1
n , h =
1
2ε, x1(0) = 0, and xi(0) = ε for i 6= 1. The opinion ut of
the truth seeker 1 at time t and the opinion vt of the other ignorants at time
t > 0 are given by
ut =
[
1
2
− α
(
1
2
− 1
n
)(
1− α
n
)t−1]
ε,
vt =
[
1
2
+
(
1
2
− 1
n
)(
1− α
n
)t−1]
ε
respectively. This can be verified, e.g., by induction. We see that the opin-
ions of the truth seekers, and here also those of the ignorants, converge to
the truth h = 12ε.
Note the opinions of ignorants may in general fail to converge to the
truth as one can see by adding some further ignorants with x˜i(0) = 3ε.
As our analytical investigation of the previous example was rather technical,
we also depict the situation for special values n = 6 and α = 23 in Figure 6.
We sketch the truth seeker by a filled circle and the ignorants by an empty
circle.
xi = ε, i = 2, . . . , 6
h = ε
2
x1 = 0
Figure 6: The dynamics in example 4.
One can easily imagine more complicated configurations as in Example
4 where one has little chance and willingness to describe the situation ana-
lytically. Our result Theorem 1 states that – whatever the parameters of a
(WASBOCOS) are – the opinions of the truth seekers converge to the truth.
This settles an open conjecture of Hegselmann and Krause.
3 The crucial objects
To get a first impression of what we may expect in terms of convergence we
consider a lonely truth seeker, i.e., n = 1.
Lemma 1 For a lonely truth seeker i = 1 we have
|xi(t+ r)− h| ≤ |xi(t)− h| · (1− α)r.
Proof.
|xi(t+ 1)− h| = |xi(t)− h| · (1− αi(t)) ≤ |xi(t)− h| · (1− α).

Clearly this bound is tight. Similar to this very special situation of a
lonely truth seeker is the case ε = 0, so that we now assume ε > 0 for the
remaining part of this article.
In order to describe the states of the discrete time dynamical system
with more than one truth seeker, we look at the truth seekers with the most
extreme opinions.
Definition 4 We define u˜(t) ∈ K as the lexicographically smallest truth
seeker which fullfills xu˜(t)(t) ≥ h and xu˜(t)(t) ≥ xk(t) for all k ∈ K. If
there is no truth seeker with opinion greater or equal to the truth h we set
u˜(t) = 0. In order to avoid case distinctions, we define x0(t
′) := h for all
t′ ∈ N. Similar we define l˜(t) as the lexicographically smallest truth seeker
that fullfills xl˜(t)(t) ≤ h and xl˜(t)(t) ≤ xk(t) for all k ∈ K. Again, we set
l˜(t) = 0 if there is no such truth seeker.
Due to the symmetrical – one could say fair – definition of the confidence
set, the confidence structure between the individuals can be described as a
simple graph with loops.
Definition 5 The confidence graph G(t) with vertex set V (t) and edge set
E(t), of a configuration x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) ∈ Rn and the additional is
defined as follows:
V (t) := [n] ∪ {0},
E(t) := {{i, j} ∈ (V2) | |xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ ε}.
For i ∈ V (t) let Ci(t) be the set of vertices in the connectivity component of
vertex i in G(t).
Because we want to keep track of the individuals which can influence
the truth seekers in the future, we give a further definition for individuals,
which is similar to Definition 4 for truth seekers.
Definition 6 We define uˆ(t) ∈ Cu˜(t)(t) as the lexicographically smallest
individual with xuˆ(t)(t) ≥ xc(t) ∀c ∈ Cu˜(t)(t) and lˆ(t) ∈ Cl˜(t)(t) as the lex-
icographically smallest individual with xlˆ(t)(t) ≤ xc(t) ∀c ∈ Cl˜(t)(t) for all
t ∈ N.
The opinions of uˆ(t) and lˆ(t) form an interval [xlˆ(t)(t), xuˆ(t)(t)] called the
hope interval which is crucial for our further investigations. To prove the
main theorem we will show that the length of this hope interval converges
to zero.
In Figure 7, we have depicted a configuration to illustrate Definition 4
and Definition 6. In particular, we have l˜ = 4, u˜ = 9, lˆ = 2, and uˆ = 12.
Individual 1 is lost and not contained in the hope interval, because there
is no path in G from 1 to l˜ = 4. So we already know that the opinion of
Individual 1 will not converge to the truth.
In the configuration depicted in Figure 8 we have l˜ = 2, u˜ = 0, lˆ = 2,
and uˆ = 5.
Note that the weights βij may be assymmetric. Thus, the sequence of
the opinions of the individuals may reorder during the time steps. As an
h h h xhxx h xxhh↓
1
↓
2
↓
3
↓
4
↓
5
↓
6
↓
7
↓
8
↓
9
10
↓
11
↓
12
0ε 12ε 1ε
3
2ε
↓
h
2ε 52ε 3ε
7
2ε
Figure 7: Illustration of Definition 4 and Definition 6.
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2ε
Figure 8: Illustration of a special case in Definition 4.
example, consider, e.g., three ignorants with starting positions x1(0) = 1ε,
x2(0) =
3
2ε, and x3(0) = 2ε. The weights may be given as β11(0) = 0.01,
β12(0) = 0.01, β13(0) = 0.98, β21(0) = 0.98, β22(0) = 0.01, β23(0) = 0.01,
β31(0) = 0.4, β32(0) = 0.4, and β33(0) = 0.2. After one time step the new
opinions are given by x1(1) = 1.985ε, x2(1) = 1.015ε, and x3(1) = 1.4ε. We
remark that it is possible to achieve every ordering of the three opinions in
one time step by choosing suitable weights βij in this example. Nevertheless
we have the following straight-forward lemma:
Lemma 2 Let i be an ignorant, l ∈ Iεi (t) be an individual with smallest
opinion and u ∈ Iεi (t) be an individual with largest opinion then we have
xi(t+ 1) ∈ [xl(t), xu(t)].
Proof. This follows directly from the system dynamics in Equation (1). 
For truth seekers we have a similar lemma:
Lemma 3 Let i be a truth seeker, l ∈ Iεi (t) be an individual with smallest
opinion, and let u ∈ Iεi (t) be an individual with largest opinion. For xi(t) ≤
h we have xi(t+ 1) ∈ [xl(t),max(h, xu(t))] and for xi(t) ≥ h we have xi(t+
1) ∈ [min(h, xl(t)), xu(t)].
Our goal is to prove that the length of the hope interval converges to zero.
To this end, we show first that the length does not increase after an iteration
of Equation (1).
Lemma 4 For all time steps t ∈ N we have xuˆ(t+1)(t + 1) ≤ xuˆ(t)(t) and
xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) ≥ xlˆ(t)(t).
Proof. We only prove the last inequality since the proof is symmetric for
the first inequality. Due to Definition 6, we have xlˆ(t+1)(t + 1) ≤ h and
xlˆ(t)(t) ≤ h. By L(t) we denote the set of individuals with opinion strictly
smaller than xlˆ(t)(t). That is, L(t′) := {i ∈ [n] | xi(t′) < xlˆ(t′)(t′)} for all
t′ ≥ t. We remark that, by definition, L(t′) does not contain a truth seeker.
We set U(t′) := [n]\L(t′); this set contains the remaining individuals.
Let u be an individual in L(t) with the largest opinion. By applying
Lemma 2 we get xi(t+ 1) ≤ xu(t) for all i ∈ L(t). Now let l (e.g., l = lˆ(t))
be an individual in U(t) with smallest opinion then by applying Lemma 2
and Lemma 3 we receive xi(t + 1) ≥ xl(t) for all i ∈ U(t). Thus, we have
lˆ(t+ 1) ∈ U(t) and so xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) ≥ xlˆ(t)(t) follows. 
In the remaining part of this article we prove that the length of the hope
interval |xuˆ(t)(t) − xlˆ(t)(t)| converges (in some special sense) to zero, as t
tends to infinity.
4 Proof of the Generalized Hegselmann-Krause Con-
jecture
One difficulty in the proof arises from the fact that convergence happens
in two phases: in a first phase, the hope interval becomes sufficiently small
so that the confidence graph is the complete graph. Then, it may happen
that truth seekers approaching the truth from one side get distracted to the
other side of the truth. At that point, however, the confidence structure
is so simple that all individuals in the hope interval converge to the truth.
Since all truth seekers are in the hope interval at all times, this proves the
theorem. Where exactly we split the phases is a technical decisison.
First, we show that after a finite number T1 of time steps, depending
only on n, ε, α, and β, the hope interval [xlˆ(T1)(T1), xuˆ(T1)(T1)] is contained
in the interval [h−ε− εαβ12 , h+ε+ εαβ12 ]. Therefore, we introduce the following
notion.
Definition 7 A good iteration is an iteration where for 1 ≤ r ≤ 3 one of
the following conditions is fullfilled:
(1) the number of individuals in the hope interval decreases,
(2) the opinion of lˆ(t+ r) reaches or passes h− ε− εαβ12 ,
(3) the opinion of uˆ(t+ r) reaches or passes h+ ε+ εαβ12 ,
(4) |xuˆ(t+r)(t+ r)− xuˆ(t)(t)| ≥ εαβ
2
12 ,
(5) |xlˆ(t+r)(t+ r)− xlˆ(t)(t)| ≥ εαβ
2
12 .
Clearly, there is only a finite number of good iterations. We may choose
T1 = 3 ·
(
n+ 2 · 1 + 2 · 12
εαβ2
)
. We formulate the next two lemmas only for
the lower bound xlˆ(t)(t) because analog arguments hold for xuˆ(t)(t). As a
shorthand we define d(i, j, t) := |xi(t)− xj(t)|. For each point in time t we
define the sets
N (t) :=
{
i ∈ [n] | d(lˆ(t), i, t) ∈
[
0,
εαβ
12
)}
,
M(t) :=
{
i ∈ [n] | d(lˆ(t), i, t) ∈
[εαβ
12
, ε
]}
, and
F(t) :=
{
i ∈ [n] | xi(t)− xlˆ(t)(t) > ε
}
.
Lemma 5 If M(t) 6= ∅ then there is a good iteration after 1 step.
Proof. We assume that there is an individual j ∈ M(t), i.e., d(lˆ(t), j, t) ∈[
εαβ
12 , ε
]
. For the evaluation of Equation (1) for elements of N (t), M(t), or
F(t) we do not need to consider the opinion of individuals in [n]\(N (t) ∪
M(t) ∪ F(t)). Let i be an element of N (t) with opinion xi(t) = xlˆ(t) + δ,
where 0 ≤ δ < εαβ12 . Let us first assume that i is an ignorant. Due to
Individual j we have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xi(t)− δ (1− 2β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
individuals in N (t)\{i}
+ 0 · β︸︷︷︸
i
+
(
εαβ
12
− δ
)
· β︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
≥ xlˆ(t) +
εαβ2
12
.
For a truth seeker we similarly get
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xi(t) + αε+ (1− α)
(
−δ (1− 2β) +
(
εαβ
12
− δ
)
· β
)
≥ xlˆ(t) +
εαβ2
12
.
Now let i be an element ofM(t)∪F(t) with xi(t) = xlˆ(t) + δ where δ ≥ εαβ12 .
In any case (i being a truth seeker or an ignorant) we have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xlˆ(t) + δ − δ(1− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
individuals with smaller opinion than i
+ β · 0 ≥ xlˆ(t) +
εαβ2
12
.

Lemma 6 If xlˆ(t) < h− ε− εαβ12 then after at least 3 time steps we have a
good iteration.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5 we can assumeM(t) =M(t+1) =M(t+2) = ∅.
We can also assume ∣∣∣xlˆ(t)(t)− xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1)∣∣∣ < εαβ212 ,∣∣∣xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1)− xlˆ(t+2)(t+ 2)∣∣∣ < εαβ212 , and
d
(
lˆ(t+ 1), 0, t+ 1
)
> ε+
εαβ
12
since otherwise we have a good iteration in at most 2 time steps. At first
we claim N (t+ 1)∩K = ∅. If at time t there is a truth seeker i ∈ N (t)∩K
then we have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xlˆ(t)(t) + αε−
(1− α)(1− β)εαβ
12
≥ xlˆ(t)(t) +
εαβ2
12
+
εαβ
12
≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) +
εαβ
12
.
So the only truth seekers that have a chance to move into the set N (t+ 1)
could be those of the set F(t). So let truth seeker i be in the set F(t) ∩K,
with xi(t) = xlˆ(t)(t) + δ, where ε < δ < ε +
εαβ
12 . (Truth seekers where
δ ≥ ε+ εαβ12 are ruled out by Lemma 3.) We have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ xlˆ(t)(t) + ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤xi(t)
− (1− α)(1− 2β)
≥ xlˆ(t)(t) + εα
≥ xlˆ(t)(t) +
εαβ2
12
+
εαβ
12
≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) +
εαβ
12
.
Similarly, we can deduce N (t + 2) ∩ K = ∅. Now we can assume that
the individuals of N (t + 1), who are all ignorants, are in the hope inter-
val at time t + 1, since otherwise we would have a good iteration after 1
time step. So there exist individuals i ∈ N (t + 1) and j ∈ F(t + 1) with
|xi(t+ 1)− xj(t+ 1)| ≤ ε. We set xi(t + 1) = xlˆ(t+1)(t + 1) + δ, where
0 ≤ δ ≤ εαβ12 and calculate
xi(t+ 2) ≥ xi(t+ 1)− (1− 2β)δ + β · 0︸︷︷︸
i
+ β
(
ε− εαβ
12
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) +
εαβ2
12
+
εαβ
12
≥ xlˆ(t+2)(t+ 2) +
εαβ
12
.
For the other direction we have
xi(t+ 2) ≤ xi(t+ 1)− βδ︸︷︷︸
lˆ(t+1)
+ (1− 2β)ε
≤ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) +
εαβ
12
+ ε− 2βε
≤ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) +
εαβ2
12
+ ε
≤ xlˆ(t+2)(t+ 2) + ε.
Thus, i ∈M(t+ 2), which results in a good iteration in three time steps. 
Thus, we can conclude:
Corollary 1 After a finite number T1(ε, n, α, β) of steps we have xlˆ(T1)(T1) ≥
h− ε− εαβ12 and xuˆ(T1)(T1) ≤ h+ ε+ εαβ12 .
Due to Lemma 1 there can not exist a general bound on the convergence
that does not depend on α. We consider the two side lengths `2(t) :=
|xuˆ(t)(t)−h| and `1(t) := |xlˆ(t)(t)−h| of the hope interval. Clearly `1(t) and
`2(t) are not increasing due to Lemma 4. For t ≥ T1 we have `1(t), `2(t) ≤
ε+ εαβ12
Lemma 7 If `1(t) + `2(t) ≤ ε then we have
(`1(t+ 2) + `2(t+ 2)) ≤ (`1(t) + `2(t)) ·
(
1− αβ
2
)
.
Proof. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that `1(t) ≥ `2(t). At first
we consider the case `2(t) > 0. If i is an ignorant with xi(t) = h− `1(t) + δ
then we have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ − (1− 2β)δ + β(`1(t) + `2(t)− δ)
≥ h− (1− β)`1(t).
For a truth seeker i with xi(t) = h− `1(t) + δ we have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ − α(δ − `1(t))− (1− α)(1− 2β)δ +
(1− α)β(`1(t) + `2(t)− δ)
≥ h− `1(t) + βδ(1− α) + α`1(t)(1− β) + β`2(t)(1− α) + β`1(t)
≥ h− (1− β)`1(t).
Similarly we obtain xi(t+ 1) ≤ h+ (1− β)`2(t) in both cases.
Next we consider the case `1(t) > `2(t) = 0 and li(t+1) > li(t) ·
(
1− α2
)
.
Let i be an arbitrary truth seeker with opinion xi(t) = h − `1(t) + δ. We
have
xi(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ + α(`1(t)− δ)− (1− α)(1− β)δ
≥ h− `1(t) + α`1(t).
Thus, we have xi(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t+ 1) + α2 · `1(t). If j is an ignorant with
xj(t+ 1) = h− `1(t+ 1) + δ, then we have
xj(t+ 2) ≥ h− `1(t+ 1) + δ − (1− 2β)δ + β
(α
2
· `1(t)− δ
)
≥ h− `1(t) + αβ`1(t)
2
.
For an arbitrary truth seeker j we have
xi(t+ 2) ≥ h− `1(t+ 1) + α`1(t+ 1)
≥ h− `1(t) + αβ`1(t)
2
.
Thus, in all cases we have (`1(t+ 2) + `2(t+ 2)) ≤ (`1(t) + `2(t)) ·
(
1− αβ2
)
.

This states that once the length of the hope interval becomes at most ε
its lengths converges to zero.
Lemma 8 Let t ≥ T1. If there exists an individual i with αβ`1(t)12 ≤ d(lˆ(t), i, t) ≤
ε, then we have `1(t+ 1) ≤ `1(t) ·
(
1− αβ212
)
. If there exists an individual i
with αβ`2(t)12 ≤ d(uˆ(t), i, t) ≤ ε, then we have `2(t+ 1) ≤ `2(t) ·
(
1− αβ212
)
.
Proof. Due to symmetry it suffices to prove the first statement. Let j be
an ignorant with xj(t) = h− `1(t) + δ, where δ ≥ 0. We have
xj(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ − (1− 2β)δ + β
(
αβ`1(t)
12
− δ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
≥ h−
(
1− αβ
2
12
)
`1(t).
For a truth seeker j with xj(t) = h− `1(t) + δ, δ ≥ 0 we have
xj(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ + α(`1(t)− δ)− (1− α)(1− 2β)δ +
(1− α)β
(
αβ`1(t)
12
− δ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
≥ h− `1(t) + βδ(1− α) + α`1(t)
(
1− αβ
2
12
)
+
αβ2`1(t)
12
≥ h−
(
1− αβ
2
12
)
`1(t).

For transparency we introduce the following six sets:
N1(t) : =
{
i ∈ [n] | d(lˆ(t), i, t) < αβ`1(t)
12
}
,
N2(t) : =
{
i ∈ [n] | d(uˆ(t), i, t) < αβ`2(t)
12
}
,
M1(t) : =
{
i ∈ [n] | αβ`1(t)
12
≤ d(lˆ(t), i, t) ≤ ε
}
,
M2(t) : =
{
i ∈ [n] | αβ`2(t)
12
≤ d(uˆ(t), i, t) ≤ ε
}
,
F1(t) : =
{
i ∈ [n] | d(lˆ(t), i, t) > ε, xi(t) ≤ h+ `2(t)
}
,
F2(t) : = {i ∈ [n] | d(uˆ(t), i, t) > ε, xi(t) ≥ h− `1(t)} .
With this the individuals of the hope interval are partitioned into
N1(t) ∪M1(t) ∪ F1(t) = N2(t) ∪M2(t) ∪ F2(t).
Lemma 9 If for k ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ T1 there exists an ignorant i ∈ Nk(t)
and an individual j ∈ Fk(t) with |xi(t) − xj(t)| ≤ ε then lk(t + 2) ≤ lk(t) ·(
1− αβ212
)
.
Proof. If lk(t + 1) > lk(t) ·
(
1− αβ212
)
, then it is easy to check that the
influence of Individual j suffices to put ignorant i in set Mk(t+ 1). In this
case we can apply Lemma 8 
Lemma 10 If Nk(t+ 1)∩K 6= ∅ and t ≥ T1 then lk(t+ 1) ≤ lk(t) ·
(
1− α2
)
for k ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Due to symmetry it suffices to consider k = 1. So let i be a truth
seeker with i ∈ N1(t+ 1). We set xi(t) = h− `1(t) + δ and calculate
xi(t+ 1) ≥ h− `1(t) + δ + α(`1(t)− δ)− (1− α)(1− β)δ
≥ h− (1− α)`1(t).

Lemma 11 For t ≥ T1 we have lk(t+ 3) ≤ lk(t) ·
(
1− αβ212
)
for at least one
k ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Due to Lemma 10 we can assume Nk(t + 1) ∩ K = ∅. At time
t + 1 there must be a truthseeker i. Without loss of generality, we assume
xi(t) ≤ h and i = l˜(t + 1). Due to Lemma 8 we can assume i ∈ F1(t + 1).
Now let j1 be the ignorant with smallest opinion fulfilling d(i, j1, t+ 1) ≤ ε.
If j1 ∈ N1(t+ 1) then we can apply Lemma 9 with j1 and i. Otherwise we
let j2 be the ignorant with smallest opinion fulfilling d(j1, j2, t+ 1) ≤ ε. So
we have d(j2, i, t+ 1) > ε and j2 ∈ N1(t+ 1). Thus, we can apply Lemma 9
with j2 and j1. 
Lemma 12 If lk(t) > ε and t ≥ T1 then we have lk(t+ 3)− ε ≤ (lk(t)− ε) ·(
1− αβ212
)
or lk(t+ 3) ≤ ε.
Proof. Due to Lemma 10, we can assume Nk(t + 1) ∩ K = ∅ and, due
to Lemma 8, we can assume Mk(t + 1) = ∅. Due to symmetry, we only
consider the case k = 1. Let i ∈ N1(t+ 1) the ignorant with largest opinion
xi(t+ 1), meaning that d(lˆ(t+ 1), i, t+ 1) is maximal.
If there exists an individual j ∈ F1(t + 1) with d(i, j, t + 1) ≤ ε, then
we can apply Lemma 9. If no such individual j exists then we must have
d(i, 0, t + 1) ≤ ε or `1(t + 1) = 0. So only the first case remains. We set
δ = d(lˆ(t+ 1), i, t+ 1) ≥ ε− `1(t+ 1). Let h ∈ N1(t+ 1) be an ignorant with
xh(t+ 1) = xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) + µ, where 0 ≤ µ ≤ δ. For time t+ 2 we get
xh(t+ 2) ≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) + µ− (1− 2β)µ+ β(δ − µ)
≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) + βδ
≥ xlˆ(t+1)(t+ 1) + β(ε− `1(t+ 1)).

From Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 we conclude:
Corollary 2 There exists a finite number T2(ε, n, α, β) so that we have
`1(t) + `2(t) ≤ ε+ εα
2β3
60
, and min(`1(t), `2(t)) ≤ εα
2β3
60
for all t ≥ T2(ε, n, α, β).
We would like to remark that, e.g., T2(ε, n, α, β) = T1(ε, n, α, β) +
36
α2β4
suffices.
Lemma 13 For each t ≥ T2(ε, n, α, β) we have
`1(t+ 3) + `2(t+ 3) ≤ ε
or
d(k, 0, t) ≤ εα
2β3
60
·
(
1− αβ
2
)⌊ t−T2
2
⌋
for all truth seekers k ∈ K.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume `1(t) ≤ εα2β360 and prove
the statement by induction on t. Due to Lemma 8 and Lemma 10, we can
assume M2(t + r) = N2(t + r) ∩ K = ∅ for r ∈ {0, 1} since otherwise we
would have `1(t+ 3) + `2(t+ 3) ≤ ε. Thus, we have d(k, 0, t+ r) ≤ εα2β360 for
all k ∈ K and K ⊆ F2(t+ r).
Due to Lemma 8 for r ∈ {0, 1}, the individuals in F2(t + r) are not
influenced by the individuals in F2(t + r) since otherwise we would have
`1(t + 3) + `2(t + 3) ≤ ε. Thus, we can apply Lemma 7 for the individuals
in F2(t). 
From the previous lemmas we can conclude Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Proof.(Proof of Theorems 1 and 2.) After a finite time T2(ε, n, α, β) we
are in a nice situation as described in Lemma 2. If we have `1(T2 + 3) +
`2(T2 + 3) ≤ ε then we have an ordinary convergence of the truth seekers
being described in Lemma 7. Otherwise we have d(k, 0, T2) ≤ εα2β360 for all
truth seekers k ∈ K. Due to Lemma 13 and Lemma 7 either we have
d(k, 0, t) ≤ εα
2β3
60
·
(
1− αβ
2
)⌊ t−T2
2
⌋
for all truth seekers k ∈ K and all t ≥ T2, or there exists an S ∈ N, such
that we have
(1) d(k, 0, t) ≤ εα2β360 ·
(
1− αβ2
)⌊ t−T2
2
⌋
for all T2 ≤ t ≤ S,
(2) d(k, 0, t) ≤ ε
(
1− αβ2
)b t−S−32 c
for all t ≥ S + 3,
for all k ∈ K. The latter case is 1-fold interrupted convergence. Thus, the
Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture is proven. 
5 Remarks
In this section we would like to generalize the Hegselmann-Krause Conjec-
ture and show up which requirements can not be weakened.
Lemma 14 A finite number n of individuals and symmetric confidence in-
tervals are necessary for a convergence of the truth seekers.
Proof. Infinitely many ignorants can clearly hinder a truth seeker in con-
verging to the truth. If the confidence intervals are not symmetric then it
is easy to design a situation where some ignorants are influencing a truth
seeker which does not influence the ignorants, so that the truth seeker has
no chance to converge to the truth. 
Lemma 15 The condition βij(t) ≥ β > 0 is necessary for a convergence of
the truth seekers.
Proof. If we only require βij(t) > 0, then we have the following example:
n = 2, x1(0) = 1− 15ε, x2(0) = 1− ε, α1(t) = 15 , α2(t) = 0, β11(t) =
(
1
2
)t+1
,
β12(t) = 1−
(
1
2
)t+1
, β21(t) =
(
1
2
)t+1
, β22(t) = 1−
(
1
2
)t+1
, and h = 1. By a
straight forward calculation we find that |x1(t)− h| ≥ 12ε for t ≥ 1. 
We remark that conditions like βij(t) + βij(t + 1) ≥ 2β would also not
force a convergence of the truth seekers in general. One might consider an
example consisting of two ignorants with starting positions h ± 710ε and a
truth seeker k with starting position h− 15ε. We may choose suitable βij(t)
and αi(t) so that we have |h− xk(t)| ≥ 15ε for all t, h− xk(t) ≥ 15ε for even
t and xk(t)− h ≥ 15ε for odd t.
For the next lemma we need a generalization of Definition 3.
Definition 8 Given ε, α, β, n, we say that the truth seekers k ∈ K are
r-fold interrupted convergent, if for each γ > 0 there exists r + 1 functions
T si (γ, ε, α, β, n, T
e
i−1), i = 1, . . . , r + 1, so that for each (WASBOCOS) Ω
with structural parameters ε, α, β and n there exist T ei ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , r
satisfying
∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ [T si (γ, ε, α, β, n, T si−1), T ei ] : |xk(t)− h| < γ
for i = 1, . . . , r, where T e0 = 0, and
∀k ∈ K, ∀t ≥ T sr+1(γ, ε, α, β, n, T er ) : |xk(t)− h| < γ.
Lemma 16 The condition αi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ K is necessary for Theorem
2. If it is dropped then the truth seekers are not (|K|− 1)-fold convergent in
general.
Proof. At first we remark that it clearly suffices to have αi(t) = 0 for
all i ∈ K only for all t ≥ T , where T is a fix integer. W.l.o.g. we assume
T = 0 and consider the following example: h = 1, xi(0) = 1 − 2iε, 1 ∈ K,
1 6= i ∈ K, βij(t) = β, αi(t) = α for the truth seekers, and αi(t) = 0 for
the ignorants until we say otherwise. Let there be a given γ > 0 being
sufficiently small. There exists a time T1 until x1(T1) < 1 − γ. Up to this
time no other individual has changed its opinion. After time T1 + 1 we
suitably choose α2(t) so that we have
1
2ε ≤ x1(T˜1) − x2(T˜1) ≤ ε. So at
time T˜1 + 1 the convergence of truth seeker 1 is interrupted the first time.
After that we may arrange it that x1 and x2 get an equal opinion and will
never differ in there opinion in the future. Now there exists a time T2 until
x2(T2) = x1(T2) < 1 − γ and we may apply our construction described
above again. Thus, every ignorant i ∈ K may cause an interruption of the
convergence of the truth seekers. 
Conjecture 1 If we drop the condition αi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ K in Theorem
2 then we have (|K|)-fold convergence of the truth seekers.
The Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture might be generalized to opinions in
Rm instead of R when we use a norm instead of | · | in the definition of the
update formula. Using our approach to prove this m-dimensional conjecture
would become very technical, so new ideas and tools are needed. We give
an even stronger conjecture:
Conjecture 2 The m-dimensional generalized Hegselmann-Krause Conjec-
ture holds and there exists a function φ(Ω, γ) so that the truth seekers in an
arbitrary generalized (WASBOCOS) Ω are φ(Ω, γ)-fold interrupted conver-
gent in ε, α, β, and n.
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